For richer, for poorer
Growing inequality is one of the biggest social, economic and political challenges of our time. But it is not inevitable, says Zanny Minton Beddoes
Oct 13th 2012 | from the print edition
IN 1889, AT the height of America’s first Gilded Age, George Vanderbilt II, grandson of the original railway magnate, set out to build a country estate in the Blue Ridge mountains of North Carolina. He hired the most prominent architect of the time, toured the chateaux of the Loire for inspiration, laid a railway to bring in limestone from Indiana and employed more than 1,000 labourers. Six years later “Biltmore” was completed. With 250 rooms spread over 175,000 square feet (16,000 square metres), the mansion was 300 times bigger than the average dwelling of its day. It had central heating, an indoor swimming pool, a bowling alley, lifts and an intercom system at a time when most American homes had neither electricity nor indoor plumbing.
A bit over a century later, America’s second Gilded Age has nothing quite like the Vanderbilt extravaganza. Bill Gates’s home near Seattle is full of high-tech gizmos, but, at 66,000 square feet, it is a mere 30 times bigger than the average modern American home. Disparities in wealth are less visible in Americans’ everyday lives today than they were a century ago. Even poor people have televisions, air conditioners and cars.
But appearances deceive. The democratisation of living standards has masked a dramatic concentration of incomes over the past 30 years, on a scale that matches, or even exceeds, the first Gilded Age. Including capital gains, the share of national income going to the richest 1% of Americans has doubled since 1980, from 10% to 20%, roughly where it was a century ago. Even more striking, the share going to the top 0.01%—some 16,000 families with an average income of $24m—has quadrupled, from just over 1% to almost 5%. That is a bigger slice of the national pie than the top 0.01% received 100 years ago.
This is an extraordinary development, and it is not confined to America. Many countries, including Britain, Canada, China, India and even egalitarian Sweden, have seen a rise in the share of national income taken by the top 1%. The numbers of the ultra-wealthy have soared around the globe. According toForbes magazine’s rich list, America has some 421 billionaires, Russia 96, China 95 and India 48. The world’s richest man is a Mexican (Carlos Slim, worth some $69 billion). The world’s largest new house belongs to an Indian. Mukesh Ambani’s 27-storey skyscraper in Mumbai occupies 400,000 square feet, making it 1,300 times bigger than the average shack in the slums that surround it.
The concentration of wealth at the very top is part of a much broader rise in disparities all along the income distribution. The best-known way of measuring inequality is the Gini coefficient, named after an Italian statistician called Corrado Gini. It aggregates the gaps between people’s incomes into a single measure. If everyone in a group has the same income, the Gini coefficient is 0; if all income goes to one person, it is 1.
The level of inequality differs widely around the world. Emerging economies are more unequal than rich ones. Scandinavian countries have the smallest income disparities, with a Gini coefficient for disposable income of around 0.25. At the other end of the spectrum the world’s most unequal, such as South Africa, register Ginis of around 0.6. (Because of the way the scale is constructed, a modest-sounding difference in the Gini ratio implies a big difference in inequality.)

Income gaps have also changed to varying degrees. America’s Gini for disposable income is up by almost 30% since 1980, to 0.39. Sweden’s is up by a quarter, to 0.24. China’s has risen by around 50% to 0.42 (and by some measures to 0.48). The biggest exception to the general upward trend is Latin America, long the world’s most unequal continent, where Gini coefficients have fallen sharply over the past ten years. But the majority of the people on the planet live in countries where income disparities are bigger than they were a generation ago.
That does not mean the world as a whole has become more unequal. Global inequality—the income gaps between all people on the planet—has begun to fall as poorer countries catch up with richer ones. Two French economists, François Bourguignon and Christian Morrisson, have calculated a “global Gini” that measures the scale of income disparities among everyone in the world. Their index shows that global inequality rose in the 19th and 20th centuries because richer economies, on average, grew faster than poorer ones. Recently that pattern has reversed and global inequality has started to fall even as inequality within many countries has risen. By that measure, the planet as a whole is becoming a fairer place. But in a world of nation states it is inequality within countries that has political salience, and this special report will focus on that.

From U to N
The widening of income gaps is a reversal of the pattern in much of the 20th century, when inequality narrowed in many countries. That narrowing seemed so inevitable that Simon Kuznets, a Belarusian-born Harvard economist, in 1955 famously described the relationship between inequality and prosperity as an upside-down U. According to the “Kuznets curve”, inequality rises in the early stages of industrialisation as people leave the land, become more productive and earn more in factories. Once industrialisation is complete and better-educated citizens demand redistribution from their government, it declines again.
Until 1980 this prediction appeared to have been vindicated. But the past 30 years have put paid to the Kuznets curve, at least in advanced economies. These days the inverted U has turned into something closer to an italicised N, with the final stroke pointing menacingly upwards.
Although inequality has been on the rise for three decades, its political prominence is newer. During the go-go years before the financial crisis, growing disparities were hardly at the top of politicians’ to-do list. One reason was that asset bubbles and cheap credit eased life for everyone. Financiers were growing fabulously wealthy in the early 2000s, but others could also borrow ever more against the value of their home.
That changed after the crash. The bank rescues shone a spotlight on the unfairness of a system in which affluent bankers were bailed out whereas ordinary folk lost their houses and jobs. And in today’s sluggish economies, more inequality often means that people at the bottom and even in the middle of the income distribution are falling behind not just in relative but also in absolute terms.
The Occupy Wall Street campaign proved incoherent and ephemeral, but inequality and fairness have moved right up the political agenda. America’s presidential election is largely being fought over questions such as whether taxes should rise at the top, and how big a role government should play in helping the rest. In Europe France’s new president, François Hollande, wants a top income-tax rate of 75%. New surcharges on the richest are part of austerity programmes in Portugal and Spain.
Even in more buoyant emerging economies, inequality is a growing worry. India’s government is under fire for the lack of “inclusive growth” and for cronyism that has enriched insiders, evident from dubious mobile-phone-spectrum auctions and dodgy mining deals. China’s leaders fear that growing disparities will cause social unrest. Wen Jiabao, the outgoing prime minister, has long pushed for a “harmonious society”.
Many economists, too, now worry that widening income disparities may have damaging side-effects. In theory, inequality has an ambiguous relationship with prosperity. It can boost growth, because richer folk save and invest more and because people work harder in response to incentives. But big income gaps can also be inefficient, because they can bar talented poor people from access to education or feed resentment that results in growth-destroying populist policies.
The mainstream consensus has long been that a growing economy raises all boats, to much better effect than incentive-dulling redistribution. Robert Lucas, a Nobel prize-winner, epitomised the orthodoxy when he wrote in 2003 that “of the tendencies that are harmful to sound economics, the most seductive and…poisonous is to focus on questions of distribution.”
But now the economics establishment has become concerned about who gets what. Research by economists at the IMF suggests that income inequality slows growth, causes financial crises and weakens demand. In a recent report the Asian Development Bank argued that if emerging Asia’s income distribution had not worsened over the past 20 years, the region’s rapid growth would have lifted an extra 240m people out of extreme poverty. More controversial studies purport to link widening income gaps with all manner of ills, from obesity to suicide.
The widening gaps within many countries are beginning to worry even the plutocrats. A survey for the World Economic Forum meeting at Davos pointed to inequality as the most pressing problem of the coming decade (alongside fiscal imbalances). In all sections of society, there is growing agreement that the world is becoming more unequal, and that today’s disparities and their likely trajectory are dangerous.

Not so fast
That is too simplistic. Inequality, as measured by Gini coefficients, is simply a snapshot of outcomes. It does not tell you why those gaps have opened up or what the trend is over time. And like any snapshot, the picture can be misleading. Income gaps can arise for good reasons (such as when people are rewarded for productive work) or for bad ones (if poorer children do not get the same opportunities as richer ones). Equally, inequality of outcomes might be acceptable if the gaps are between young people and older folk, so may shrink over time. But in societies without this sort of mobility a high Gini is troubling.
Some societies are more concerned about equality of opportunity, others more about equality of outcome. Europeans tend to be more egalitarian, believing that in a fair society there should be no big income gaps. Americans and Chinese put more emphasis on equality of opportunity. Provided people can move up the social ladder, they believe a society with wide income gaps can still be fair. Whatever people’s preferences, static measures of income gaps tell only half the story.
Despite the lack of nuance, today’s debate over inequality will have important consequences. The unstable history of Latin America, long the continent with the biggest income gaps, suggests that countries run by entrenched wealthy elites do not do very well. Yet the 20th century’s focus on redistribution brought its own problems. Too often high-tax welfare states turned out to be inefficient and unsustainable. Government cures for inequality have sometimes been worse than the disease itself.
This special report will explore how 21st-century capitalism should respond to the present challenge; it will examine the recent history of both inequality and social mobility; and it will offer four contemporary case studies: the United States, emerging Asia, Latin America and Sweden. Based on this evidence it will make three arguments. First, although the modern global economy is leading to wider gaps between the more and the less educated, a big driver of today’s income distributions is government policy. Second, a lot of today’s inequality is inefficient, particularly in the most unequal countries. It reflects market and government failures that also reduce growth. And where this is happening, bigger income gaps themselves are likely to reduce both social mobility and future prosperity.
Third, there is a reform agenda to reduce income disparities that makes sense whatever your attitude towards fairness. It is not about higher taxes and more handouts. Both in rich and emerging economies, it is about attacking cronyism and investing in the young. You could call it a “True Progressivism”.
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As you were
After a period on the wane, inequality is waxing again
Oct 13th 2012 | from the print edition
JANE AUSTEN’S “PRIDE AND PREJUDICE” is a story about love. It is also about inheritance and income gaps. The heroine, Elizabeth Bennet, comes from a well-off family, the second of five daughters. But her financial future is dark because, in the absence of sons, her father’s estate will pass to a cousin. Elizabeth’s suitor, the brooding Mr Darcy, is fabulously wealthy. To her mother’s horror, Elizabeth at first rebuffs him.
All ends happily when Elizabeth decides that Darcy is ravishing after all. But her mother’s reaction is a rational response to the realities of income distribution and social mobility in Austen’s time. In an entertaining analysis of inequality, “The Haves and the Have Nots”, Branko Milanovic works out that by marrying Mr Darcy, Elizabeth would increase her income 100-fold. Without him, she would have the same income as a merchant seaman. With him she would be catapulted into the top 0.1%.
Before the industrial revolution, wealth gaps between countries were modest: income per person in the world’s ten richest countries was only six times higher than that in the ten poorest. But within each country the distribution of income was skewed. In most places a small elite lorded it over a mass of peasants. There was little social mobility except, as Elizabeth found, through marriage. Colonial America was an exception to this feudal sclerosis. Research by Peter Lindert and Jeffrey Williamson shows that on the eve of the American revolution incomes in the 13 colonies that formed the United States were more equal than in virtually “any other place on the planet”.
The industrial revolution widened the gaps both between countries and within them. As incomes accelerated in western Europe and then America, the distance between these countries and others grew. So, too, did internal income disparities. One study suggests that England’s Gini coefficient shot up from 0.4 in 1823 to 0.63 in 1871. Mill workers were more productive and earned more than rural labourers. The great industrialists reaped the rewards of building railways, steel mills and other transformative technologies. Their fortunes were also boosted by monopolistic power and crony capitalism.
The growth of the industrial workforce brought increasing political pressure for redistribution. Communism was the most dramatic result. But capitalist economies changed profoundly too. In response first to the formation of workers’ unions and the rise of socialist parties and then to the Depression, politicians on both sides of the Atlantic introduced progressive taxes, government regulation and social protection. In Germany Bismarck pioneered pensions and unemployment insurance in the 1880s. In America Theodore Roosevelt’s Square Deal broke up monopolies (“trusts”) in the first decade of the 20th century. In the 1930s the New Deal introduced Social Security (pensions), disability and unemployment insurance. In Britain Lloyd George’s People’s Budget of 1909 raised income taxes and inheritance taxes at the top to fund basic pensions as well as unemployment and health insurance for workers. This spartan social safety net was transformed by the Labour government after 1945 with a National Health Service and a system of cradle-to-grave benefits.
Of the three levers used to narrow inequality—taxation, government spending and regulation—the tax system changed the fastest. Until the late 19th century tariffs and excise taxes were the main source of revenue. By the 1930s governments relied heavily on progressive income taxes to fund their (much larger) spending. Britain’s tax take in 1860 was some 8% of GDP; by 1927 it had risen to almost 20%. America changed its constitution to introduce an income tax in 1913. In 1944 the top rate reached a peak of 94%.
Punitive rates of taxation did not, by themselves, transform the income distribution. Many fortunes in the early 20th century were destroyed by wars, hyperinflation and the Depression; France, for instance, lost a third of its capital stock in the first world war and two-thirds in the second. But high tax rates made it much harder for fortunes to be built up again. In most countries the share of the top 1% fell persistently from the 1920s until the late 1970s.
Taxes rose across the advanced world, but the ways that governments spent them varied greatly. In America, whose government was more interested in equality of opportunity than of income, the most transformative shift was to bring in mass education. Starting around 1910, America made huge investments in public high schools in pursuit of universal secondary education. After the second world war the GI bill offered all returning soldiers the chance of higher education.
Claudia Goldin and Larry Katz, two economists at Harvard, see this dramatic boost to education as the main cause of the narrowing of inequality in America in the mid-20th century. It also boosted social mobility. Daniel Aaronson and Bhashkar Mazumder of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago found that as college enrolment surged in the 1940s, the relationship between parents’ and their children’s relative earnings notably weakened.
In Europe the emphasis was on ensuring egalitarian outcomes with big government transfers, particularly after the second world war. Governments in Europe were slower than in America to invest in mass education, but many continental countries built even bigger welfare states than Britain, with generous jobless benefits, child subsidies and income support. In virtually all rich countries other than America such benefits (rather than progressive tax systems) became the most important instruments for reducing inequality.
The third leg of the state’s response to inequality was regulation. Roosevelt’s trustbusting weakened America’s robber barons, and other legal changes protected workers’ rights to organise and, especially in Europe, to conclude binding national pay agreements. Union power soared and minimum wages enshrined in law narrowed the gap between workers and managers. Banking, a big source of wealth in the early 20th century, was heavily regulated after the Depression.
The Great Compression
All this meant that for decades incomes at the bottom and in the middle of the distribution grew faster than those at the top. The exact timing and scale differed. In America disparities declined fastest in the 1930s and 1940s, in Europe after the second world war. America’s Gini coefficient reached a low of around 0.3 in the mid-1970s, and Sweden’s hit 0.2 at about the same time. In most advanced economies the gap between rich and poor in the 1970s was a lot narrower than it had been in the 1920s. This was the era now widely known as the “Great Compression”.
Income gaps between countries, however, continued to widen as the advanced industrial economies pulled ever farther ahead of less developed ones (with a few notable exceptions such as post-war Japan and then Taiwan and South Korea). By the 1970s average income per person in the ten richest countries was around 40 times higher than that in the ten poorest. This divergence among countries outweighed the compression within them. As a result, the “global Gini”, as measured by Messrs Bourguignon and Morrisson, rose.
But around 1980 both these trends went into reverse. Globally, poorer countries began to catch up with richer ones, and within countries richer people began to pull ahead. The surge in emerging markets began with Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 reforms in China. By the 2000s the large majority of emerging economies were growing consistently faster than rich countries, so much so that global inequality at last started to fall even as the gaps within many countries increased.
The coincidence of timing suggests that the reversals are related. The huge changes that have swept the world economy since 1980—globalisation, deregulation, the information-technology revolution and the associated expansion of trade, capital flows and global supply chains—narrowed income gaps between countries and widened them within them at the same time. The modern economy’s global reach hugely increased the size of markets and the rewards to the most successful. New technologies pushed up demand for the brainy and well-educated, boosting the incomes of elite workers. The integration of some 1.5 billion emerging-country workers into the global market economy boosted returns to capital, ensuring that the “haves” would have more. It also hit the rich world’s less educated folk with unaccustomed competition.
Politicians in search of a scapegoat find it easier to blame globalisation than technology for the widening wage gaps in rich countries, and some studies of America’s wage dispersion conclude that around 10-15% of the widening wage gap can be explained by trade. One analysis, by David Autor at MIT and colleagues, suggests that in manufacturing the impact of trade with China could be much bigger. But most economists reckon that technological change plays a far bigger role. The OECD, in a big cross-country analysis, concludes that “skill-biased technological change” is one of the main determinants of the rich world’s wage inequality. On average, it finds, globalisation—as measured by a country’s trade exposure and financial openness—has no significant impact.
Whatever the exact breakdown, these two factors are increasingly hard to separate. The IT revolution has allowed more goods and services to be traded across borders, and it has fuelled the integration of the global capital market. At the same time emerging economies are now often the source of innovation. Technology accelerates globalisation, and globalisation accelerates technological progress.
At the same time technology is undermining some of the 20th century’s equalising institutions. Assembly-line manufacturing, for instance, was conducive to union organisation. That is much less true of many of the cognitive jobs of the digital era. Many social transformations are also making inequality worse, particularly the rise of single parenthood and “assortative mating” (the tendency of educated people to marry each other).
Does all this mean that ever widening inequality is inevitable? The history of inequality suggests it need not be, and offers two lessons. The first is that market and social forces do not operate in a vacuum. For good or ill, the mix of tax reforms, welfare programmes and regulatory interventions pursued in the 20th century combined to reduce inequality. Those policy choices matter just as much today. If they did not, changes in income distribution would have been much more uniform across countries. Instead, much like a century ago, sweeping global forces have been muted, or exacerbated, by government policies and social institutions.
The second lesson is that governments can narrow inequality without large-scale redistribution or an ever growing state. The 20th century’s most dramatic reductions in income gaps took place when governments, by and large, were smaller than they are today. Large, rigid welfare states proved unsustainable. But there was also a successful progressive prescription for reducing income gaps and boosting mobility by attacking crony capitalism, investing in the young (especially by broadening access to education) and creating a safety net for the poorest (particularly through unemployment insurance and pension schemes). Worryingly, governments in some of the countries where inequality has risen most seem to have forgotten that.
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Like a piece of string
Sizing the gap
Oct 13th 2012 | from the print edition

ECONOMIC INEQUALITY CAN be measured in many ways—by the distribution of wealth, income or consumption, or between races, sexes, regions or individuals. The resulting picture can vary a lot. In America, for instance, the income gap between blacks and whites, and men and women, has narrowed over the past 30 years, even as that between individuals has widened. Disparities in consumption are always smaller than those in income because people save and borrow to smooth their living standards. The distribution of wealth is usually less equal than that of annual incomes. Gaps in pre-tax income are larger than those in disposable income after taxes and government transfers.
The main measures of economic inequality used in this special report are the Gini coefficients for disposable income and consumption derived from household surveys. These surveys are now conducted in almost all countries. In the rich world and in Latin America, official Gini coefficients are usually based on income. In Asia and Africa consumption-based figures are more common.
Cross-country comparisons can be tricky. Inequality in India, for instance, is often said to be lower than in China. But China’s Gini coefficient of 0.48 measures inequality of income, whereas India’s official Gini of 0.33 measures consumption. Peter Lanjouw and Rinku Murgai of the World Bank calculated an income Gini for India which, at 0.54, is much higher than China’s and close to Brazil’s.
Another problem is that there are several international databases, all slightly different. Nor are household surveys good at capturing inequality at the very top, not least because it is all but impossible to get the ultra-rich to take part in them. The best information on the highest incomes comes from tax returns, thanks to work pioneered by two French economists, Emmanuel Saez and Thomas Piketty, together with a Briton, Anthony Atkinson, and an Argentine, Facundo Alvaredo. These four have built a huge database of top incomes which now includes 26 countries. Their statistics go back much further than household surveys (in America’s case, to 1913).
Gini coefficients and the top income share can paint different pictures. Argentina’s Gini, for instance, has fallen sharply over the past decade even as the share of income going to the top 1% has risen. Germany’s Gini has risen by 32% since the early 1980s, but the share of income going to the very top has barely budged. One reason is that the statistics cover different people; another is arithmetic. The Gini aggregates all disparities, so it is a better summary measure, but it does not tell you where the gaps are growing.
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The United States
The rich and the rest
American inequality is a tale of two countries
Oct 13th 2012 | from the print edition

THE HAMPTONS, A string of small towns on the south shore of Long Island, have long been a playground for America’s affluent. Nowadays the merely rich are being crimped by the ultra-wealthy. In August it can cost $400,000 to rent a fancy house there. The din of helicopters and private jets is omnipresent. The “Quiet Skies Coalition”, formed by a group of angry residents, protests against the noise, particularly of one billionaire’s military-size Chinook. “You can’t even play tennis,” moans an old-timer who stays near the East Hampton airport. “It’s like the third world war with GIV and GV jets.”
Thirty years ago, Loudoun County, just outside Washington, DC, in Northern Virginia, was a rural backwater with a rich history. During the war of 1812 federal documents were kept safe there from the English. Today it is the wealthiest county in America. Rolling pastures have given way to technology firms, swathes of companies that thrive on government contracts and pristine neighbourhoods with large houses. The average household income, at over $130,000, is twice the national level. The county also marks the western tip of the biggest cluster of affluence in the country. Between Loudoun County and north-west Washington, DC, there are over 800,000 people in exclusive postcodes that are home to the best-educated and wealthiest 5% of the population, dubbed “superzips” by Charles Murray, a libertarian social scientist.

The Hamptons and Washington’s chic suburbs offer two snapshots of the most striking characteristic of American inequality: the surge in wealth at the top. Washington’s superzips are full of the rich: people in the top 5% of the income distribution (which means an annual income of at least $150,000) and the top 1% (those earning more than $340,000 a year). The helicopter passengers in the Hamptons epitomise America’s ultra-wealthy, the 0.1% of the population whose annual household income is at least $1.5m, and the top 0.01%, with an annual income of $8m or more. Over the past 30 years incomes have soared both among the wealthy and the ultra-wealthy. The higher up the income ladder, the bigger the rise has been. The result has been a huge, and widening, gap—financially, socially and geographically—between America’s elite and the rest of the country.
How this happened is a story in three acts. During the 1980s the least-educated Americans fell behind those in the middle. As the computer revolution increased the demand for skilled workers and old manufacturing industries crumbled, those with just a high-school degree or less saw their relative earnings sink. Over the past decade the squeeze moved to the middle of the income distribution, to those who attended college but did not earn a degree. Incomes at the top, meanwhile, rose smartly during the whole period.
The result was a dramatic divergence in fortunes. Between 1979 and 2007 (just before the financial crisis) the real disposable income after taxes and transfers of the top 1% of Americans more than quadrupled, a cumulative rise of over 300%. Over the same period the bottom fifth’s income rose by only 40%. The middle class shrank, both as a share of the population and geographically. Only 40% of American neighbourhoods now have an average income within 20% of the national median, compared with 60% in the 1970s.
The recession temporarily upended this trend. America’s wealthiest fared poorly in 2008 and 2009, largely because the tanking stockmarket ravaged their bonuses and share options. The government safety net prevented a collapse at the bottom. But the sluggish recovery has brought back the old pattern. More than 90% of all income gains since the recession ended have gone to the top 1%.
What lies behind these widening gaps? A big reason, particularly in the bottom half, is education, or rather the lack of it. Just as the information-technology revolution demanded more skilled workers, the continuous improvement in Americans’ education stalled. High-school graduation rates stopped climbing in the 1970s, for the first time since 1890. College completion rates also slowed. Many Americans were failing to match the new technologies with better skills. According to Harvard’s Ms Goldin and Mr Katz, this explains 60% of America’s widening wage inequality between 1973 and 2005.
College and/or bust

Both the soaring cost of a college education and the shortcomings of America’s schools system played a part. In the 1970s a year’s tuition at a public university cost 4% of a typical household’s annual income; at a private university it took about 20%. By 2009 tuition fees had jumped to over 10% of median income for a public university and around 45% for a private one. Even with the surge in subsidised student loans, many potential graduates were priced out or dropped out early without a degree.
In primary and secondary schools the problems are partly financial but mainly organisational. America spends a lot on its schools, but that funding comes largely from state and local governments. Richer neighbourhoods can afford better schools, which reinforces the growing geographical gap between different social groups. According to the OECD, America is one of only three advanced countries which spends less on the education of poorer children than richer ones. And unlike most OECD countries, America does not put better teachers in poorly performing schools, where teachers’ unions often obstruct reform efforts.
Not everything can be pinned on schooling. American women (like women almost everywhere) are better educated and earn more than they did 30 years ago. It is less skilled men who have fallen behind. Almost uniquely among rich countries, American men now aged between 25 and 34 are less likely than their fathers to have a college degree. The damage from this has been compounded by institutional changes, such as the weakening of unions and, particularly, the erosion of the minimum wage. But the main culprit is educational slippage.
This poor performance has a racial tinge. High-school dropouts are disproportionately black or Hispanic. America’s habit of locking up large numbers of young black men does not help their employability. But the decline increasingly affects the white working class too. Ever more low-skilled white American men have left the labour force, many moving onto disability rolls. Even before the recession, only around two-thirds of white men with nothing more than a high-school diploma were working.
This decline of work among less skilled white men has had profound social consequences, which in turn have exacerbated income inequality. Marriage rates have fallen, divorce has increased and the share of children born to single mothers has soared. Mr Murray calculates that fewer than 30% of children in the poorest third of white America live with both parents by the time their mother turns 40. Among the most affluent fifth, around 90% of children live in a household with both parents. Marriage has become a fault-line dividing American classes.
Tax and benefit changes have also had an effect, but a subtle one. Most Americans below the median income level pay no federal income tax (and, thanks to the Earned Income Tax Credit, the working poor get substantial rebates). Poorer Americans are hit disproportionately by payroll taxes, which are regressive and have grown in importance. But the biggest hit is on the benefit side. Although America’s social spending has rocketed (it is now worth some 16% of GDP), it is becoming less redistributive as Medicare, the universal health plan for the elderly, swallows up ever more (see article). According to the Congressional Budget Office, in 1979 over half of all federal social spending went to the poorest fifth of households. Now it is only 36%.
Part of the trend at the top of America’s income ladder is simply the mirror image of that at the bottom. The rising skill premium has rewarded those with lots of education, and social shifts have reinforced the income concentration. Not only are the well-off and well-educated far more likely to marry and stay married than poorer folk, they tend to marry each other. In 1960 American couples with two college-educated partners accounted for only 3% of the total. Today that figure is 25% and in the top 5% of the income distribution it is 75%. Apart from the cleaning lady, it is hard to find an adult without a degree (or two or three) in super-zip households.
But if educational differentials and assortative mating lie behind much of the gap between those in Loudoun County and poorer Americans, they do not explain the Hamptons phenomenon. America’s top 0.1% are no better educated than the top 1%. Income gaps at this level have less to do with the skills-bias of the modern economy and more to do with its global reach.
In a classic paper published in 1981, the late Sherwin Rosen of the University of Chicago pointed out that the very best in a field, be they entertainers or textbook authors, earned vastly more than the next best. Modern communications, he mused, would transform the market for superstars. And so they have, as Chrystia Freeland, a journalist, points out in her new book, “Plutocrats”. Moreover, in the past three decades the potential market has become dramatically bigger, whether for Hollywood blockbusters or celebrity dentists.
Celebrities do not account for a large share of America’s ultra-rich. But the same factors—winner-takes-all economics coupled with an incomparably bigger global economy—explain part of the rise in the incomes of the chief executives who make up a bigger share of the very wealthy. During the 1980s CEO pay surged more in America than anywhere else. Until the early 1980s American chief executives, on average, earned 40% more than their next two lieutenants. By 2000 they earned two-and-a-half times as much.
In a global market for the best CEO talent where winner-takes-all economics prevails, the gap between the top and the rest is bound to be vast
This rise is widely put down to failures of corporate governance and a collapse in social norms which once set an informal limit on the earnings gap between bosses and workers. There is truth to both explanations, and it is not hard to find chief executives earning tens of millions of dollars despite lacklustre performance. But these effects should not be exaggerated. In a recent paper Steven Kaplan, of the University of Chicago, finds that CEO pay has fallen in recent years and that, contrary to myth, CEOs who perform badly get paid less and are fired more often than successful ones.
There is also a less bothersome explanation for CEO pay that is based on superstar economics. America is home to a lot of the world’s biggest companies, and globalisation has made many of them a lot bigger. In a global market for the best CEO talent where winner-takes-all economics prevails, the gap between the top and the rest is bound to be vast.
For all the attention focused on CEO pay, the numbers of chief executives among America’s ultra-rich are neither particularly big or growing. The very richest Americans—those who feature in the Forbes list of billionaires—tend to be entrepreneurs, from the icons of the tech era (Bill Gates, Mark Zuckerberg) to many whose money has more prosaic roots (Sara Blakely, America’s youngest female billionaire, made her fortune from women’s underwear).
A disproportionate, and growing, chunk of the very rich, however, have made their money in Wall Street rather than Main Street. An analysis by Mr Kaplan and Joshua Rauh, now of Stanford University, shows that the share of investment bankers among the top 0.1% is larger than the share of senior executives. America’s top 25 hedge-fund managers make more than all the CEOs of the S&P 500 combined. The financial industry’s outsize pay partly reflects its growth. For good or ill, finance’s share of American GDP soared between 1980 and 2007. Capital markets have globalised faster and more comprehensively than any other part of the economy, enabling hedge funds and other asset managers to deploy ever bigger pools of funds. According to Thomas Philippon of New York University and Ariell Reshef of the University of Virginia, financiers also have higher skill levels than they did a generation ago.
These fundamental economic shifts explain part of the rise in Wall Street incomes, but not all of it. Messrs Philippon and Reshef argue that between a third and half of Wall Street’s higher pay is unjustified, deriving from rents rather than productivity. But what explains these rents? Luigi Zingales of the University of Chicago points out that one source is the implicit subsidy (through lower borrowing costs) that banks enjoy by being too big to fail. He reckons this subsidy is worth some $30 billion a year, enough to fund a fair few bonuses. Others point to a broader cronyism between Wall Street and Washington over the past 30 years which has allowed financiers to tilt rules in their favour. The finance industry (along with property and insurance) employs more lobbyists than virtually any other industry, around four per Congressman.
Financiers have also been among the biggest winners from changes to America’s tax code. The country’s top rate of income tax has been repeatedly slashed since 1980, from 70% to 35%. By itself, that reduction has not greatly affected average tax burdens at the top (since there have been enough loopholes to ensure that few people paid the top rate). America’s richest have gained more from reductions in the capital-gains tax, which is now only 15%. Private-equity moguls have done particularly well, since the tax code allows them to classify their income as capital gains.
Scratching each other’s backs
The combination of tax loopholes, bank bail-outs and massive lobbying has led many observers to conclude that America’s growing inequality has political roots. The wealthy, in this logic, control the political system and rig it to their advantage. In an influential book, “Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age”, Larry Bartels of Vanderbilt University showed that senators’ votes are influenced by the preferences of their rich citizens but not their poor ones. As money plays an ever bigger role in politics, goes the argument, so the clout of the ultra-wealthy grows, particularly to block things they don’t like.
This claim is hard to prove, but circumstantial evidence for it seems to be mounting, particularly since the Supreme Court’s 2010 “Citizens United” decision lifted any restrictions on political spending by individuals or firms. That opened the way for the rise of “super-PACs”, privately funded organisations set up to influence election outcomes. These have now raised hundreds of millions of dollars. The sources of this money are highly concentrated: one analysis suggests that 80% of the total comes from fewer than 200 donors. America is still a long way from the first Gilded Age, when the robber barons openly bought unelected senators’ loyalty by giving them shares in their companies. But it is hard to believe that this surge of cash from the richest will have no impact at all.
Whatever its causes, the stratification of American society is having profound consequences. A country that prides itself on its social mobility is already less mobile than most people think and is almost certainly becoming even less so. As the box with the previous article showed, standard measures of inter-generational mobility in America are lower than in Canada and much of Europe. Most of this has to do with the difficulty of escaping from the bottom rungs of America’s income ladder. According to Markus Jantti, a Finnish economist who has studied mobility across countries, more than 40% of the sons of the poorest 20% of Americans stay in that quintile, compared with around 25% in Nordic countries. The evidence is mixed on whether social mobility has lessened or simply stayed the same over the past 30 years. But it is clear that there has been no improvement in mobility to compensate for widening inequality.
And even the most recent studies of social mobility look at the earnings of people who were children over two decades ago. Since disparities in income, education and social behaviour now strongly reinforce each other, future mobility might be a lot lower still. A study by Sean Reardon of Stanford University suggests that the gap in standardised test scores between schoolchildren from high- and low-income families is roughly 30-40% bigger today than it was 25 years ago. Bob Putnam, of Harvard University, puts it starkly. Put away the rear-view mirror and look at future social mobility, he says, and “we’re about to go over a cliff.”
_______________________
Crony tigers, divided
dragons
Why Asia, too, is becoming increasingly unequal
Oct 13th 2012 | from the print edition

THE SUMMIT OF Songshan mountain, some 60 miles (100km) from China’s capital, marks the boundary between Beijing municipality and the neighbouring province of Hebei. It is also a study in contrasts. On the Beijing side the mountain road is wide, freshly surfaced and flanked by a solid safety wall. A Lycra-clad cyclist sweats his way up on a fancy mountain bike. A large car park is under construction for visitors to hot springs in the nearby village of Bangongqu. Enterprising local families can make 100,000 yuan ($16,000) a year catering to Beijing tourists, not far off the city’s average white-collar wage. The Beijing provincial government provides pensions and other social benefits.
Hebei is a much poorer province. On its side of the mountain the road narrows and the tarmac deteriorates. Half a mile from the summit is the village of Yanjiaping, where some 50 families scrape a living growing cabbages. No one has a car, no one gets a pension, and the nearest primary school is 12 miles away. Farmers are barred from grazing cows on the mountainside so that trees can grow to stem sand storms from Inner Mongolia. Shen Zhiyun, a gnarled man in fake US army fatigues, says a village family makes 4,000-5,000 yuan a year, nowhere near Indian levels of poverty, but a far cry from the living standards only a few miles away. “We live in a different country,” he says.
The transformation of China’s economy over the past 30 years is the most spectacular growth story in history. Less noticed, China has also seen the world’s biggest and fastest rise in inequality. China has not officially published a Gini coefficient since 2000, but a study by the China Development Research Foundation suggests that it has surged from less than 0.3 in 1978 to more than 0.48. In little more than a generation Mao’s egalitarian dystopia has become a country with an income distribution more skewed than America’s. Asia’s two other giants, India and Indonesia, have also seen disparities rise sharply, though less dramatically than China. Indonesia’s Gini is up by an eighth, to 0.34.
Part of this rise was both inevitable and welcome, a natural consequence of the end of Maoist communism in China and Fabian socialism in India. The three economies, particularly China’s, are far richer and more dynamic than they were 30 years ago. Just as Kuznets suggested, urbanisation and industrialisation have brought widening gaps. As people have left subsistence agriculture for more productive work in cities, inequality has risen along with prosperity.
But that cannot be the whole explanation, if only because the experience of today’s Asian tigers is in striking contrast to that of an earlier pack. In Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan growth rates soared in the 1960s and 1970s and prosperity increased rapidly but income gaps shrank. Japan’s Gini coefficient fell from 0.45 in the early 1960s to 0.34 in 1982; Taiwan’s from 0.5 in 1961 to below 0.3 by the mid-1970s. That experience launched the idea of an “Asian growth model”, one that combined prosperity with equity.
Education, again
Today’s Asian growth model does the opposite. One explanation is that the big forces driving modern economies—technological innovation and globalisation—benefit the skilled and educated in emerging markets much as they do in the rich world. Narayana Murthy, the billionaire co-founder of Infosys, an Indian software giant, or Robin Li, the creator of Baidu, China’s most popular search engine, have harnessed technology much like Bill Gates has done. Senior lawyers and bankers in Mumbai or Shanghai are part of a global winner-takes-all market, able to command salaries similar to those of their colleagues in New York or London. And as Ravi Kanbur of Cornell University points out, the offshoring of tasks that has hit mid-level workers in America and Europe often benefits people higher up the skills ladder in recipient countries. Call centres in Bangalore are manned by well-educated Indians.
As in the rich world, these fundamental economic forces are not the only drivers of income distribution. Government policy has also played a big role. One problem is cronyism. As in the Gilded Age in America, capitalism in today’s emerging markets involves close links between politicians and plutocrats. India is a case in point. From spectrum licences to coal deposits, large assets have been transferred from the state to favoured insiders in the past few years. Many politicians have business empires of one kind or another. Rich businessmen often become politicians, particularly at the state level. Raghuram Rajan, an Indian-born economist at the University of Chicago who recently became chief economic adviser to India’s government, has pointed out that India has the second-largest number of billionaires relative to the size of its economy after Russia, mainly thanks to insider access to land, natural resources and government contracts. He worries that India could be becoming “an unequal oligarchy or worse”.

In China cronyism is even more ingrained. The state still has huge control over resources, whether directly through state-owned enterprises, monopoly control of industries from railways to mining or the distorted financial system, where interest rates are artificially depressed and access to credit is influenced by politics. The importance of the state means that the beneficiaries tend to be close to state power.
Moreover, inequality in China could be higher than the official statistics suggest because rich people often understate their income and hide it from the taxman. A lot of money is invested in property, where soaring prices have reinforced inequality. Wang Xiaolu, of the China Reform Foundation, caused a stir a couple of years ago with a study that tried to measure this “grey” income. His results suggest that the income of the richest 10% of urban Chinese is some 23 times that of the poorest 10%. Official statistics say the multiple is nine.
Cronyism is the most obvious way in which Asian governments make inequality worse, but it is not the only one. Broader government strategies have distorted countries’ growth paths in a manner that increased income gaps. In India a big problem is the lack of job creation. Unlike China, where the surge in factories assembling goods for export brought millions of migrant workers into the formal urban labour force, India’s formal workforce has barely grown since 1991. More than 90% of Indians are still employed in the informal sector. Even in manufacturing, most people toil in one-room workshops rather than big factories. Productivity is lower, workers find it hard to improve their skills and their incomes rise more slowly.
India’s failure to become a powerhouse of labour-intensive manufacturing owes much to its appalling infrastructure. Just-in-time delivery is hard to achieve when power supplies are so precarious. Another reason is the country’s rigid labour laws, which discourage the formation of big firms. Between the federal government and the states, India has around 200 different laws, all setting detailed rules and making it virtually impossible to fire people. That deters employers from hiring workers and widens the gap between the lucky educated few and the rest.
We know where you live
In China the regulations that contribute most to inequality are the remnants of the country’s hukou system of household registration. This hails from Mao’s era, when China’s rural sector was punitively taxed to finance the development of heavy industry. To ensure a stable supply of workers in agriculture despite the appalling conditions, people were barred from leaving their province of origin. The restrictions on mobility were dismantled in the 1980s, permitting millions to become migrant workers. But they still retain the rural hukouof their birth, as do their children. From housing to schooling, this puts them at a big disadvantage compared with holders of urban hukou.
Migrants’ children must take the gaokao (the all-important state college-entrance exam) in their place of origin, not where they and their parents might be living at the time, so lots of migrants send their children home for schooling. Since education is financed largely by local governments, these schools tend to be less well-funded and of lower quality. Hebei has far worse schools than Beijing. In Shanghai municipality, spending per student in rural areas is only 50-60% that of urban areas. As a result, the education system reinforces income disparities rather than mitigating them.
Along with disparities in infrastructure, the hukou system is a big reason for China’s vast urban-rural gaps, which explain about 45% of the country’s overall inequality. Other Asian economies do not suffer from a hukou problem, but there, too, government social policies have often made inequality worse because most social spending, from public housing to health insurance, has traditionally been confined to the formal, urban workforce. Moreover, many Asian governments spend a lot on universal subsidies, especially for energy. These are highly regressive. Indonesia, for instance, lavished 3.4% of GDP on fuel and electricity subsidies last year, more than it spent on infrastructure. According to the Asian Development Bank, 40% of that largesse flowed to the richest 10% of Indonesian households and as much as 84% to the top half.
Across emerging Asia political concerns about rising inequality are prompting reform
Things are beginning to change. Across emerging Asia political concerns about rising inequality are prompting reform, often in ways that echo the changes of the Progressive Era a century ago. In China the “Great Western Development Strategy” has poured vast sums into infrastructure in the western provinces. More recently the government has made a big effort to improve rural social services. Almost 100% of China’s rural population now have basic health insurance (including the villagers of Yianjiaping), and a majority have basic pensions. Inequality between urban and rural areas has recently stabilised and that between regions has begun to fall slightly, but from an extraordinarily high level.
In the past couple of years several Asian economies, from Thailand to Vietnam, have introduced, or expanded the reach of, minimum wages. China’s minimum wage, which is set at the provincial level, rose by an average of 17% last year. Some countries have introduced public-work schemes for the poorest. India’s NREGA scheme, for instance, guarantees 100 days’ work a year to the country’s rural households and now covers 41m people. Others have experimented with targeted subsidies to the very poorest that have helped reduce inequality in Latin America (see article).
By introducing a more efficient, and progressive, social safety net, Asia’s governments will go some way towards mitigating their growing income gaps. But there will be no big breakthroughs until the bigger problems of informality (in India), discrimination against migrants (China) and cronyism (everywhere) are dealt with. And the longer that takes, the greater the danger that today’s disparities will become entrenched.
Thanks to remarkable economic growth, almost all Asians are rapidly becoming better off. In India, old caste rigidities are being broken down (see article). But widening income gaps threaten to harm future social mobility. Using a methodology developed at the World Bank, a study by Zhang Yingqiang and Tor Eriksson found that the rise in China’s income inequality is mirrored by a rise in its inequality of opportunity. Parents’ income and their type of employer explain about two-thirds of China’s inequality of opportunity, a much bigger share than is explained by parental education.
The stakes are high. Yu Jiantuo of the China Development Research Foundation argues that China’s inequality is now hurting its growth prospects. Sustained cronyism could turn Asia’s big economies into entrenched oligarchies rather than dynamic meritocracies. Ironically, in that sense they might become more like Latin America just as that continent appears to be moving in the opposite direction.
__________________________
Published: May 26, 2012 00:52
This White Paper on black money is blank
Arun Kumar

Any discussion on the parallel economy will be incomplete until it accounts
for the nexus that drives it
A White Paper on a subject is issued by the government presumably
to give a definitive view on it and inform the public of an important issue. The
White Paper on black money does nothing of the sort. The Opposition had made a
demand for it given the large number of scams that have been in the news. But
the paper hardly deals with any of them.
The Finance Minister in his preface admits that he is presenting
“… this document now in response to an assurance given to the Parliament.” The
implication is that he is not giving anything definitive. He also says that he
would have been happier if he “… could have included the conclusions of reports
of three premier institutions that have been tasked to quantify the magnitude of
black money.” It is surprising that these three institutions are only looking at
the magnitude rather than the gamut of issues surrounding the black economy.
Thus, even after these reports are presented, we may not have a better
understanding of the problem. After all, knowing the quantum of black money in
the country is not the same thing as analysing how to deal with the problem.
Quotes old data
The White Paper consists of five chapters and several appendices
spread over about 100 pages. This seems like a lot. It lifts many arguments from
this author's book on the subject and from these columns in the last year and a
quarter. But it flatters to deceive.
The title itself is incorrect. What is estimated is the annual
generation of black incomes in an economy and not how much black money there is
in the economy. The various estimates mentioned are of black income and not
black money. The definition of “black money” given is itself erroneous, with
money confused for assets. Even an elementary economics or commerce textbook
suggests that money is only one part of the portfolio of assets that an economic
agent may own. Hence referring to the whole by a part is not appropriate. The
definitional confusion is made worse when it is stated that “the term black
money would also include income that is concealed from public authorities.”
Even then, the report does not give an estimate but simply quotes
estimates from reports that were written more than 25 years ago, ignoring later
literature that has also brought about greater clarity in the matter. The first
chapter ends with the title, “Need for more research.” Why state the obvious?
The earlier reports that this Paper relies upon had pointed to how big the
problem already was. So why has the government not studied it since then?
It quotes the Global Financial Integrity (GFI) report of 2010 on
how much illicit flow has taken place from India since independence. That report
mentions that its figure is a gross underestimate. It is convenient to quote
from the GFI report because it gives a low figure but why has the government not
made the effort in the last year-and-a-half to remove deficiencies in the GFI
methodology and use the data collected by its intelligence agencies and other
departments to arrive at a better estimate?
One service the Paper does is to list the many agencies involved
in dealing with the problem. So far so good, but why have these agencies failed
in the task they should have been performing, namely, checking the growth of the
black economy? What are the problems they have faced? Why does prosecution fail
most of the time whether it relates to the income tax department, or the police
or the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI)? Is that the reason why the
powerful have treated the law with contempt, and for the increase in the number
of people resorting to illegality resulting in the growth of the black
economy?
Functioning of judiciary
A large number of laws to check the black economy are mentioned
but there is no analysis of why they have been ineffective in controlling the
problem. A law on paper differs substantially from its practice. Much space is
devoted in the Paper to international treaties and efforts at the global level.
This is convenient since the black wealth held outside is small compared to what
is held in the country. Further, it is far more difficult to get at the black
wealth held abroad compared to tackling what is held in the country. Thus, it
becomes convenient to discuss the former rather than the latter.
Most of the wealth held abroad illegally would not be in the names
of the actual beneficiaries but in the names of shell companies, and most of it
cannot be tracked to an Indian entity.
No wonder the data on deposits in Swiss Banks given in the Paper
indicates that Indians have only between 0.13 and 0.29 per cent of the deposits.
There is no analysis of this problem or of how money is transferred out of the
country. We could have been enlightened if information with the intelligence
agencies about tax havens and the modus operandi of taking funds out of the
country or of generating incomes outside India were revealed.
Vulnerable sectors
The interface between the judiciary and the investigative agencies
is an important aspect of non-implementation of the laws of the land and the
contempt they have come to be held in by the public. That is the cause of the
judicial delays with four crore cases pending. Even routine matters that should
be decided in a few months drag on for years. This encourages perpetrators of
the black economy. The functioning of the judiciary needed to be dissected.
The paper lists the real estate, bullion and jewellery sectors as
vulnerable to black money generation. This again reflects a definitional
confusion. Activities in these sectors constitute transfers of black savings
from one individual to another, and as such circulate black incomes but do not
generate them.
In the chapter “Way Forward,” strategies are listed but again no
new ground is broken. As has been pointed out earlier in these columns, the
Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) and the Tax Information Exchange
Agreement (TIEA) are about declared incomes abroad and not black savings held
abroad. Similarly, voluntary disclosure schemes have been discredited in the
past. The Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India has said the scheme
turns people into habitual tax offenders.
Nexus and political questions
The paper skirts the most important question, namely, why laws do
not get implemented. It avoids mentioning the nexus between politicians,
officials and businessmen that drives the black economy, and how criminals have
entered this nexus. Why have steps taken in the past to control the black
economy not worked?
The answer to why there are so many omissions in the Paper lies in
the fact that the existence and the control of the black economy are political
questions. Dealing with the black economy is not a narrow technical question
that can be tackled by a few more laws or a few steps here and there, or
strengthening of a few provisions of the law or through computerisation. Whether
it is the ruling party or the opposition, national or regional parties, all of
them have been mired in the black economy. The question is one of political
will. Should the Paper not have called a spade a spade rather than avoiding the
difficult question all together?
But then a White Paper is a political document and not a technical
one. It helps the government whitewash its image and diverts attention from the
difficult questions. It is not an instrument that can generate the political
will to action — a task that only movements and the political process can
accomplish.
___________________
Left wants “serious effort” on black money
CPI(M) wants all undisclosed assets abroad to be confiscated
The Communist Party of India (Marxist) has demanded that the government make “a serious effort” to quantify the illicit funds stashed away abroad by Indians and identify the culprits.
In a statement issued on Tuesday, the CPI(M) Polit Bureau has said undisclosed assets of Indians located abroad should be confiscated by the government as per the provisions of the Income Tax Act.
‘No political will’
Reacting to the Finance Ministry's white paper on black money presented in Parliament on Monday, the party said the documents reflected a “trite exercise devoid of any political will.”
“Neither has any credible estimate of black money stashed [away] abroad been provided by the white paper nor have any concrete measures been suggested to retrieve the illicit funds,” it said.
The white paper states that the total amount of Indian deposits in Swiss banks fell from Rs. 23,373 crore in 2006 to Rs. 9,295 crore in 2010. The government seems to have no clue as to where this amount has gone. There is no assessment of Indian deposits in other offshore financial centres. The paper suggests that much of illicit financial outflows are round-tripped into India through Foreign Direct Investment via the Mauritius route or via FII investments through Participatory Notes. Yet, there is no specific recommendation to ban Participatory Notes or to scrap the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement with Mauritius, the statement said.
Talking to reporters here, CPI(M) leader Sitaram Yechury assailed the United Progressive Alliance-II government for “failing on all fronts,” saying it has not fulfilled any promise to bring succour to the people reeling under price rise, unemployment and corruption.
“In the three years of UPA-II rule, not a single step has been taken on any front to alleviate the burden of the people. The government is in a state of drift,” he said.
It said the amount of undisclosed income of Indians who figure in the lists of secret-bank-accountholders received from the German and French governments respectively, were Rs. 40 crore and Rs. 565 crore only.
“These are minor parties. The Indian individuals and entities who are holding a bulk of the illicit wealth in offshore accounts are yet to be identified. The white paper, disappointingly, [simply] reiterates the myriad technical difficulties involved in retrieving these huge amounts stashed abroad.”
Doubts sincerity
The CPI(M) said “lack of progress” in getting information or taking action “raises doubts over the sincerity of the UPA government on this crucial issue” and demanded “serious effort” to quantify the illicit funds and identify the culprits.
Meanwhile, the Communist Party of India has said it finds the white paper a futile exercise without any clear-cut directions for action to unearth the black money.
“It smacks of hidden attempts to protect the offenders and does not come out with figures quantifying the extent of black money. It seems to be an exercise done in a hurry to save the falling face of UPA-II and divert the attention of the public from the notoriety that it has earned through numerous scams worth unheard[of] sums of money,” the CPI said in a statement.
The statement pointed out that rather than coming out with concrete steps to unearth the illegally-begotten money, the white paper gives further time to the offenders by announcing to set up a Lokpal to deal with the same.
Left wants “serious effort” on black money
CPI(M) wants all undisclosed assets abroad to be confiscated
The Communist Party of India (Marxist) has demanded that the government make “a serious effort” to quantify the illicit funds stashed away abroad by Indians and identify the culprits.
In a statement issued on Tuesday, the CPI(M) Polit Bureau has said undisclosed assets of Indians located abroad should be confiscated by the government as per the provisions of the Income Tax Act.
‘No political will’
Reacting to the Finance Ministry's white paper on black money presented in Parliament on Monday, the party said the documents reflected a “trite exercise devoid of any political will.”
“Neither has any credible estimate of black money stashed [away] abroad been provided by the white paper nor have any concrete measures been suggested to retrieve the illicit funds,” it said.
The white paper states that the total amount of Indian deposits in Swiss banks fell from Rs. 23,373 crore in 2006 to Rs. 9,295 crore in 2010. The government seems to have no clue as to where this amount has gone. There is no assessment of Indian deposits in other offshore financial centres. The paper suggests that much of illicit financial outflows are round-tripped into India through Foreign Direct Investment via the Mauritius route or via FII investments through Participatory Notes. Yet, there is no specific recommendation to ban Participatory Notes or to scrap the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement with Mauritius, the statement said.
Talking to reporters here, CPI(M) leader Sitaram Yechury assailed the United Progressive Alliance-II government for “failing on all fronts,” saying it has not fulfilled any promise to bring succour to the people reeling under price rise, unemployment and corruption.
“In the three years of UPA-II rule, not a single step has been taken on any front to alleviate the burden of the people. The government is in a state of drift,” he said.
It said the amount of undisclosed income of Indians who figure in the lists of secret-bank-accountholders received from the German and French governments respectively, were Rs. 40 crore and Rs. 565 crore only.
“These are minor parties. The Indian individuals and entities who are holding a bulk of the illicit wealth in offshore accounts are yet to be identified. The white paper, disappointingly, [simply] reiterates the myriad technical difficulties involved in retrieving these huge amounts stashed abroad.”
Doubts sincerity
The CPI(M) said “lack of progress” in getting information or taking action “raises doubts over the sincerity of the UPA government on this crucial issue” and demanded “serious effort” to quantify the illicit funds and identify the culprits.
Meanwhile, the Communist Party of India has said it finds the white paper a futile exercise without any clear-cut directions for action to unearth the black money.
“It smacks of hidden attempts to protect the offenders and does not come out with figures quantifying the extent of black money. It seems to be an exercise done in a hurry to save the falling face of UPA-II and divert the attention of the public from the notoriety that it has earned through numerous scams worth unheard[of] sums of money,” the CPI said in a statement.
The statement pointed out that rather than coming out with concrete steps to unearth the illegally-begotten money, the white paper gives further time to the offenders by announcing to set up a Lokpal to deal with the same.
______________________
THE WORLD OF: TOP FIVE COUNTRIES WITH BLACK MONEY ...
http://poweraccess.blogspot.in/2009/04/top-five-countries-with-black-money.html
______________________________
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/opinion/indias-culture-of-black-money/article2134566/print/

India has turned Mahatma Gandhi’s ideal of honesty in public life on its
head, and the maelstrom ignited by anti-corruption crusader Anna Hazare is
symptomatic of this malaise.
The country’s political leadership, whom the great man once inspired to
higher purpose, has fallen into the hands of crooks and self-promoters, and they
have spawned a culture of rampant corruption and self-aggrandizement.
Why is India so corrupt? Because the country’s politics have become a passage
to quick riches and influence-peddling. Those who are good at nothing float
regional caste-based parties just as entrepreneurs float ventures in the West to
gain positions of power.
Not surprisingly, nearly 30 per cent of the MPs in India’s Parliament have a
criminal record or charges pending against them – from murder to kidnapping to
forgery to theft. There’s no way to throw them out because the overburdened
legal system – where more than 30 million cases are pending – takes decades to
produce verdicts.
So why do Indians vote for these people? Well, the culture is characterized
by collectivism – not individualism – where the head of a family, clan, caste or
group decides on the candidate. They will vote for someone of their own caste or
group even if he’s a criminal.
Consequently, many regional political parties have sprung up around corrupt
caste/clan leaders. Having entrenched themselves in their positions, these
leaders run their parties as family fiefdoms, appointing only family members to
senior positions. In fact, all political leaders – including the Italian-born
Sonia Gandhi, who heads the ruling Congress Party – groom their sons and
daughters to take over from them to keep power in the family.
Shockingly in a poor country such as India, many of these political elites
flaunt a lifestyle so rich and luxurious that it could be the envy of any
Hollywood star. Only in India do political leaders live free in
multimillion-dollar government-owned palatial bungalows spread over two to eight
acres in New Delhi.
The corrupt political elites have also made the Indian bureaucracy their
partners in crime. And the politician-bureaucrat nexus has been extended to the
business world. If corporate efficiency has propelled India to become one of the
world’s fastest growing economies, then inefficient governance thanks to the
politician-bureaucrat-business nexus has turned it into one of the world’s most
corrupt nations.
Were India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, who promised to “hang
the corrupt from the nearest lamppost,” to return today, he would commit suicide
after seeing that “black money” (income from illegal activities) accounts for
almost half of the country’s GDP. Another $1.7-trillion is hidden abroad. Only
32 million out of more than a billion Indians pay taxes, and most transactions
are carried out in cash.
Those who suffer the most in this booming black money industry are the masses
of Indians forced to pay bribes to get a job or a driver’s licence or a passport
or their kids admitted to school. So it’s no surprise that, in anti-corruption
activist Anna Hazare, the frustrated masses have found a new-age Gandhi – and
they’ve taken to the streets seeking justice.
Gurmukh Singh is the Canada correspondent for India's Indo-Asian News
Service.
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